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A test is said to control for type I error if it is unlikely to re-
ject the data-generating process. However, if it is possible to produce
stochastic processes at random such that, for all possible future re-
alizations of the data, the selected process is unlikely to be rejected,
then the test is said to be manipulable. So, a manipulable test has
essentially no capacity to reject a strategic expert.
Many tests proposed in the existing literature, including calibra-
tion tests, control for type I error but are manipulable. We construct
a test that controls for type I error and is nonmanipulable.
1. Introduction. Professional forecasts are often presented as probabilis-
tic statements [see, e.g., Gneiting and Raftery (2005) for a review of the role
of probabilistic forecasts in meteorology]. The quality of these forecasts is
regularly tested empirically. A concern [which can be traced back at least
to Brier (1950)] is that if forecasts are tested, then experts may misreport
their forecasts with the intention of passing the test. Recent literature shows
that, without any knowledge about the data-generating process, it is possi-
ble to produce forecasts that pass some empirical tests on all possible future
realizations of the data.
An example of a test that can be manipulated in this way is the well-
known calibration test. Suppose that a stochastic process generates in every
period an outcome that can be either 0 or 1. The calibration test requires
the empirical frequency of 1 to be close to p in the periods that 1 was fore-
casted with probability close to p. Dawid (1982) shows that the forecasts of
the data-generating process will eventually be calibrated. Foster and Vohra
(1998) show that any individual can produce forecasts with a random device
such that, for all possible infinite strings of zeros and ones, the realized fore-
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casts will eventually be calibrated as well, with probability one according to
the random device used by the individual.
It is natural to seek tests that cannot be manipulated. We address this
problem in the present paper. We study the following framework: A stochas-
tic process generates in every period an outcome that can be 0 or 1 (we make
no assumptions, such as an independent, identically distributed process). Be-
fore any data are observed, an expert named Bob delivers a theory, defined
as a mapping that takes as an input any finite string of outcomes and re-
turns as an output a probability of 1; equivalently, theories are probability
measures P on the space of infinite sequences of outcomes.
A tester named Alice tests Bob’s theory P by selecting an event AP (i.e.,
a set of sequences of outcomes), which Alice regards as consistent with the
theory P . We call AP the acceptance set and its complement the rejection
set for the theory P . If, for every P , the event AP has high probability
according to P , then the data-generating process will not be rejected (with
high probability). We then say that the test controls for type I error (of
rejecting the data-generating process).
Assume that Bob knows nothing about the data-generating process. How-
ever, Bob may use a random device ζ to select his theory P . At first, Alice
cannot tell whether the announced theory coincides with the data-generating
process or was selected at random. This must be determined by the data.
If, for any sequence of outcomes, Bob’s theory P is not rejected with high
probability according to Bob’s random device ζ , then we say that the test
can be manipulated (with this high probability), or we say, equivalently, that
the test has essentially no capacity to reject theories produced strategically.
Many tests that control for type I error have essentially no capacity to
reject theories produced strategically. The calibration test can be manip-
ulated. Several extensions of the calibration test have also been proven to
be manipulable [see, e.g., Fudenberg and Levine (1999), Lehrer (2001) and
Sandroni, Smorodinsky and Vohra (2003)]. Other statistical tests can also
be manipulated. A prequential test rejects or accepts a theory based only
on the observed data sequence and the next period forecasts made by the
theory along the realized sequence of outcomes [see Dawid (1991) for more
details on the prequential principle]. Many standard statistical tests, in-
cluding calibration tests, are prequential tests, and prequential tests can be
manipulated [see Sandroni (2003), Vovk and Shafer (2005), Olszewski and
Sandroni (2008) and Shmaya (2008)].
Dekel and Feinberg (2006) show that, under the continuum hypothesis,
there exists a test that does not reject the data-generating process and
cannot be manipulated because every random device ζ fails this test with
certainty on an uncountable number of paths. We construct a (nonprequen-
tial) test, called the global category test, that also does not reject the data-
generating process with probability one and cannot be manipulated. How-
ever, our construction does not assume the continuum hypothesis; that is, it
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is performed within the Zermelo–Fraenkel axioms and the axiom of choice.
In addition, the global category test is explicitly constructed; that is, we
give set-theoretic formulas for the acceptance sets.
The significance of dispensing the continuum hypothesis can be seen in
a simple example. Assume that Bob announces an easy to describe theory
(e.g., 0 and 1 occur with probability 0.5 in all periods) and the sequence of
outcomes follows an easy-to-describe deterministic process (e.g., 0 in every
third period and 1 otherwise). If Alice uses the test in Dekel and Feinberg
(2006), no researcher can determine whether Alice rejects Bob’s theory. If
she uses the global category test, this is a straightforward determination.
The global category test cannot be manipulated, in the sense that every
random device ζ fails this test with certainty on all paths except a first
category set of them.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our basic
concepts and show some classic examples of tests (calibration and likelihood
tests). In Section 3, we construct the global category test and provide an
informal discussion of nonmanipulability. In Section 4, we show that the
global category test can be modified to address the problem that, in practice,
testers observe only finite data sets. We also show that the global category
test can be modified so as to belong to the familiar class of likelihood tests. In
addition, we exhibit a large class of tests that are not necessarily prequential
tests, but can be manipulated. Finally, still in Section 4, we offer some
additional results on the manipulability of random prequential tests and an
informal discussion on the implications (for the prequential principle) of the
finding that prequential tests can be manipulated while some nonprequential
tests cannot be manipulated. Proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2. Basic concepts. Each period one outcome, 0 or 1, is observed (our
results generalize to any finite number of outcomes per period). Let Ω =
{0,1}∞ be the set of all paths, that is, infinite histories. A finite history
sm ∈ {0,1}
m, m ≥ t, (or a path s ∈ Ω) is an extension of a history st ∈
{0,1}t if the first t outcomes of sm or s coincide with the outcomes of st. In
the opposite direction, let sm | t (or s | t) be the history st ∈ {0,1}
t whose
outcomes coincide with the first t outcomes of sm or s. A cylinder with base
on st is the set C(st) ⊂ {0,1}
∞ of all infinite extensions of st. We endow
Ω with the topology that compares unions of cylinders with a finite base.
Let ℑt be the algebra that consists of all finite unions of cylinders with base
on {0,1}t. Denote by N the set of natural numbers. Let ℑ be the σ-algebra
generated by the algebra ℑ0 :=
⋃
t∈N ℑt; that is, ℑ is the smallest σ-algebra
that contains ℑ0.
Let ∆(Ω) be the set of all probability measures on (Ω,ℑ). We endow ∆(Ω)
with the weak*-topology and the σ-algebra of Borel sets (i.e., the smallest
σ-algebra that contains all open sets in weak*-topology).
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As is well known, the weak*-topology consists of all unions of finite inter-
sections of sets of the form
{Q ∈∆(Ω) : |EPh−EQh|< ε},
where E stands for the expected-value operator P ∈∆(Ω), ε > 0, and h is
a real-valued and continuous function on Ω. We refer the reader to Rudin
(1973) for additional details on the weak*-topology. We also define ∆∆(Ω)
as the set of probability measures on ∆(Ω).
Before any data are observed, an expert named Bob announces a prob-
ability measure P ∈ ∆(Ω), which (Bob claims) describes how nature will
generate the data. To simplify the language, we call a probability measure
a theory. A tester named Alice tests Bob’s theory empirically.
Definition 1. A test is a function T : Ω×∆(Ω)→{0,1}.
That is, a test is defined as an arbitrary function that takes as input a
theory and a path and returns a verdict that is 0 or 1. When the test returns
a 1, it does not reject (or, simply, accepts) the theory. When a 0 is returned,
the theory is rejected.
Any test divides paths into those in AP := {s ∈ Ω | T (s,P ) = 1}, where
the theory P is accepted, and those in Ω−AP , where the theory is rejected.
The set AP is called the acceptance set, and its complement Ω−AP is called
the rejection set. We consider only tests T such that the acceptance sets
AP are ℑ-measurable.
Given a theory P ∈∆(Ω), a path s ∈Ω and a history st = s | t, let
fP0 (s) := P (C(1)) and f
P
t (s) :=
P (C(st,1))
P (C(st))
be forecasts made along s. fPt (s) is arbitrarily defined as 0 when P (C(st)) =
0. The forecasts of P and P ′ are equivalent along s if fPt (s) = f
P ′
t (s) for all
periods t≥ 0. A test T is prequential if for any given two theories P and P ′,
equivalent along s, T (s,P ) = 0 if and only if T (s,P ′) = 0. So, a prequential
test rejects or accepts a theory based only on the forecasts made by the
theory along the realized path. Fix any ε ∈ [0,1].
Definition 2. A test T does not reject the data-generating process with
probability 1− ε if for any P ∈∆(Ω)
P (AP )≥ 1− ε.
That is, a test does not reject the data-generating process (with high
probability) if, no matter which probability measure P generates the data,
P is not likely to be rejected according to its own probability distribution
over paths.
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2.1. Classic examples of tests. Given a path s ∈ Ω, let It(s) be the tth
outcome of s. The test
T (s,P ) = 1 if and only if lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
t=1
[fPt−1(s)− It(s)] = 0
requires the average forecast of 1 to match the empirical frequency of 1.
The test in Lehrer (2001) requires the match between average forecasts
and empirical frequencies to occur on several subsequences. The calibration
test requires the empirical frequency of 1 to be near p ∈ [0,1] in the periods
in which 1 was forecasted with probability close to p.
One well-known class of tests not based on matching empirical frequencies
is likelihood tests. Let Q :∆(Ω)→∆(Ω) be any function that takes a theory
P as an input and returns an alternative theory QP as an output. The
likelihood test T is defined by
T (s,P ) = 1 iff ∀n∈NP (C(sn)) 6= 0
and
lim sup
n→∞
QP (C(sn))
P (C(sn))
<∞, sn = s | n.
This test requires that the likelihood of QP does not become arbitrarily
larger than the likelihood of P. A proof that calibration and likelihood tests
do not reject the data-generating process with probability one can be found
in Dawid (1982, 1985).
Calibration tests are prequential tests because, like many other well-
known tests, they take as an input not the entire theory but only the data
and the forecasts made by the theory along the realized sequence of out-
comes. A likelihood test may or may not be a prequential test, depending
upon the way the alternative theory QP is selected as a function of P . In
Section 4, we exhibit examples of prequential and nonprequential likelihood
tests.
2.2. Manipulating tests. Foster and Vohra (1998) show that Bob can
pass the calibration test on all paths if he is allowed to select theories at
random. More precisely, the calibration test can be manipulated with prob-
ability one according to the following definition:
Definition 3. A test T can be manipulated with probability 1− ε if
there exists a random generator of theories ζT ∈∆∆(Ω) such that, for every
path s ∈Ω,
ζT ({P ∈∆(Ω) | T (s,P ) = 1})≥ 1− ε.
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Naturally, our definition of manipulability requires a measurability provi-
sion on the sets {P ∈∆(Ω) :T (s,P ) = 1}. However, to ease the exposition,
we deal with measurability issues in the Appendix.
Fudenberg and Levine (1999), Lehrer (2001), Sandroni, Smorodinsky and
Vohra (2003) show that generalized calibration tests can also be manipu-
lated. Sandroni (2003), Vovk and Shafer (2005), Olszewski and Sandroni
(2008) and Shmaya (2008) show that prequential tests that can be manip-
ulated. A partial review of this literature can be found in Cesa-Bianchi and
Lugosi (2006). We also refer the reader to Gneiting, Balabdaoui and Raftery
(2007) for additional comments on this literature.
The random generator ζT may depend only on the test T . It follows that,
even if Bob does not know the data-generating process, he can be very
confident that by selecting theories at random before any data are observed
he will not fail any of these tests, no matter which data are realized in the
future.
The crucial property we seek is the existence, for every random generator
of theories, of a path at which rejection may occur (because it ensures that
it is feasible to reject strategically produced theories). However, stronger
properties may be obtained. Alice may be interested in paths such that
randomly produced theories fail the test with near certainty (as opposed to
probability higher than ε) and such that the sets of these paths are larger
than a single path.
Definition 4. Fix a test T . Given a random generator of theories ζ ∈
∆∆(Ω) and ε≥ 0, let Rεζ ⊆Ω be the set of all paths s ∈Ω such that
ζ({P ∈∆(Ω) | T (s,P ) = 0})≥ 1− ε.
The set Rεζ is called the revelation set, where the random generator of
theories ζ fails to manipulate the test with probability 1− ε.
In Section 3, we exhibit a test such that for all random generators of the-
ories ζ , the revelation sets are always non-empty (and topologically large).
3. A nonmanipulable test. In this section, we construct a test that can-
not be manipulated, that is, a test with nonempty revelation sets. In addi-
tion, we show that the revelation sets are topologically large in the following
sense: Given a subset A of a (complete metric) space, let A¯ be the closure
of A. A set A is called nowhere dense when the interior of its closure A¯
is empty. A first-category set is a countable union of nowhere-dense sets. A
first-category set may be regarded as (topologically) small. The complement
of a first-category set may be regarded as (topologically) large. We refer the
reader to Oxtoby (1980) for these definitions and some basic results regard-
ing first-category sets.
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We now define our test. Let S = {s1, s2, . . .} be a countable dense subset
of Ω (i.e., for every cylinder C with finite base, there exists a path si that
belongs to C; e.g., C can be the set of paths with all but a finite number
of outcomes equal to zero). Fix any k ∈N. For every path si, there exists
a period t ∈N such that the cylinder C(sit) with base on the finite history
sit = s
i | t satisfies
P (C(sit)−{s
i})≤
1
2k+i
.(3.1)
Indeed, the sequence of sets C(sit)−{s
i} is descending (as t goes to infin-
ity), and its intersection is empty. So, P (C(sit)−{s
i}) goes to zero as t goes
to infinity. Let t(i, k,P ) be the smallest natural number such that (3.1) is
satisfied.
Given a dense set of paths S = {s1, s2, . . .}, the global category test T̂S can
be defined as follows:
T̂S(s,P ) =
0, if s /∈ S and s ∈
∞⋂
k=1
∞⋃
i=1
C(sit(i,k,P ));
1, otherwise.
Let Rˆ0ζ be the revelation set for the random generator of theories ζ ∈
∆∆(Ω).
Theorem 1. Fix any countable dense set S ⊂ Ω. The global category
test T̂S does not reject the data-generating process with probability one. Given
any random generator of theories ζ ∈∆∆(Ω), the revelation set Rˆ0ζ is the
complement of a first-category set of paths.
The global category test controls the type I error of rejecting the data-
generating process and it cannot be manipulated. If the data-generating
process is announced, then it passes the global category test with probability
one. On the other hand, no matter which random generator of theories ζ is
employed, failure is inevitable on the paths of the revelation set Rˆ0ζ . This
set is nonempty (and topologically large).
The main objective of this paper is to construct a test that is nonmanip-
ulable according to Definition 3, that is, in the sense studied in the existing
literature. Naturally, our result is limited to our definition of manipulation.
Alternative definitions of strategic manipulation are beyond the scope of
this paper.
The global category test can be combined with any other test to produce
a harder test. Even so, no test can avoid the following difficulty: for any
finite collection of probability measures Q1, . . . ,Qk over outcome paths, and
for any test T that does not reject the data-generating process with high
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probability, Bob can ensure that his randomly selected theory is unlikely to
be rejected on a set of outcome paths whose Qj-probabilities (j = 1, . . . , k)
are arbitrarily close to one [see Sandroni and Olszewski (2008)].
Since the proof of Theorem 1 is somewhat involved, it is relegated to the
Appendix, but the key idea of this proof is simple. The rejection sets for the
global category test have been defined as an intersection of unions of small
cylinders C1, C2, . . . around paths s
1, s2, . . . (from which the paths s1, s2, . . .
have additionally been removed). The fact that a cylinder around each path
is included in the rejection set guarantees that, for any single theory, the
rejection set is topologically large; moreover, the fact that those cylinders
are small guarantees that the data-generating process will not be rejected.
Suppose now that we are given a random generator of theories ζ . Since
cylinders C1, C2, . . . are defined for every single theory around the fixed
set of paths s1, s2, . . . , it follows that sufficiently small cylinders around
those paths s1, s2, . . . will be contained in cylinders C1, C2, . . . , respectively,
for a set of theories whose ζ-probability is sufficiently close to one. As the
intersection of topologically large sets is itself a topologically large set, there
exists a topologically large set contained in the rejection sets for a set of
theories whose ζ-probability is equal to one.
3.1. Informal discussion on manipulability. A result concerning the ma-
nipulability of a test can be interpreted in different ways. Consider a fore-
caster whose objective is to be calibrated. The Foster and Vohra (1998)
result shows that the forecaster’s goal can be achieved no matter how the
data evolves in the future. Hence, from this forecaster’s perspective, the Fos-
ter and Vohra (1998) result is positive. The results of Sandroni (2003), Vovk
and Shafer (2005), Olszewski and Sandroni (2008) and Shmaya (2008) show
that, like calibration, many observable properties of the data-generating
process can be obtained by a strategic forecaster, no matter how the data
evolves in the future. So, these results show how to produce forecasts that,
in the future, will prove to have some observable properties of the data-
generating process. However, these strategically produced forecasts may re-
main bounded away from the predictions of the data-generating process,
and these forecasts need not have all observable properties of the data-
generating process simultaneously (only the properties used to define some
specific manipulable test). Hence, whether strategically produced forecasts
are desirable from the perspective of a forecaster is an arguable point, as this
may depend upon the objective of the forecaster. Now, consider the concept
of manipulability from the viewpoint of a tester.
Assume that Alice wants to determine whether Bob has information about
the data-generating process that she does not have. If this is Alice’s objec-
tive, then a manipulable test (e.g., the calibration test) has limited use to her
when Bob knows the test that will be used (see Section 4.2 for a discussion
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of the case in which Bob does not know the test at the time of delivering his
theory). Even in the extreme case that Bob is completely uninformed about
the data-generating process, he can strategically pass such a test. Hence,
Alice knows from the outset (i.e., before any data is revealed) the verdict
that, with near certainty, the test will deliver once the data is revealed.
The difficulty with manipulable tests can be understood in the context
of a contracting problem between a tester (Alice) and an expert (Bob) who
claims, before any data is observed, to know the data-generating process.
Alice does not know the data-generating process, and she is willing to pay
a reward that gives Bob utility u > 0 if he announces his theory at period
zero. In order to discourage Bob from delivering an arbitrary theory, Alice
stipulates a penalty if Bob’s theory is rejected by her test. This penalty
gives Bob disutility d > u (Bob does not discount the future). Bob observes
Alice’s test before deciding whether to accept Alice’s contract. Bob receives
no reward and no penalty if he does not accept the contract.
Alice looks for a screening contract, which will be accepted by Bob if
informed about the data-generating process and rejected by Bob if unin-
formed about the data-generating process. Then, Alice learns whether Bob
is informed from Bob’s choice on whether to accept the contract.
Assume that the test does not reject the data-generating process with
probability 1−ε, where ε is small enough so that u−dε > 0 and u−d(1−ε)<
0. Bob, if informed, accepts the contract because his expected utility with
the contract is positive (and without the contract his utility is zero). On
the other hand, if Bob is uninformed, then he faces uncertainty. He does
not know the odds that any theory is rejected. Assume that Bob evaluates
his prospects based on the minimum expected utility he obtains. This is
the most pessimistic behavioral rule of decision under uncertainty among
those axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Formally, if Bob is
uninformed and uses a random generator of theories ζ ∈∆∆(Ω), then his
payoff, with a contract, is
u− d sup
s∈S
ζ{P ∈∆(Ω) | T (s,P ) = 0}.(3.2)
If Alice’s test is manipulable, then Bob, although extremely averse to
uncertainty, accepts her contact because his payoff with the contract (3.2) is
positive. Hence, a manipulable tests cannot be used to construct a screening
contract that Bob, if informed, accepts and if uninformed, does not accept.
On the other hand, if Alice’s test is nonmanipulable, then Bob, when un-
informed, does not accept Alice’s contract, as his payoff with the contract is
negative. So, a nonmanipulable test does produce a screening contract. Bob
accepts this contract (and, therefore, Alice pays Bob) only when Bob deliv-
ers to Alice something she values (the data-generating process), as opposed
to a theory selected by a method that she can produce on her own without
having to pay an expert for it.
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3.2. Limitations of the main result. The main objective of this paper is
to construct a nonmanipulable test. Nonmanipulability is in our opinion a
desirable property (at least as far as Bob knows in advance the test that will
be used), because it ensures the feasibility of the rejection of a strategic, but
otherwise completely uninformed, expert. However, we do not claim that an
uninformed expert is likely to be rejected by a global category test, nor do
we claim that a theory that passes our test must be closely related to the
data-generating process.
In addition, we are not confidently advocating the use of global category
tests. An uninformed expert may accept Alice’s contract, even if she adopts
a global category test, when Bob adopts a less pessimistic behavioral rule
to evaluate uncertain prospects. Moreover, global category tests have not
been extensively studied, and they may have undesirable properties. On the
other hand, global category tests do not reject the data-generating process
with probability one. Hence, they can be combined with any other test
without reducing the odds that the data-generating process is rejected. This
combined test remains nonmanipulable.
4. Additional results. In this section, we show modified forms of the
global category test and discuss some of its properties. We begin with the
simple observation that tests, as defined in Section 2, give a verdict only after
observing an infinite history. In practice, a tester can only observe finite data
sets and, therefore, may find more applicable tests that give some verdict
with a finite number of outcomes.
Definition 5. Rejection tests have the property that, for any theory
P ∈∆(Ω), the rejection set Ω−AP is a union of cylinders.
So, a rejection test rejects a theory in finite time.
Definition 6. A test T2 is harder than a test T1 if
{s ∈Ω:T2(s,P ) = 1} ⊆ {s ∈Ω:T1(s,P ) = 1}.
If T2 is harder than T1, then rejection by T1 implies rejection by T2.
Proposition 1. Fix any δ ∈ (0,1 − ε]. Let T1 be any test that does
not reject the data-generating process with probability 1 − ε. There exists
a rejection test T2 that is harder than the test T1 and does not reject the
data-generating process with probability 1− ε− δ.
Proposition 1 is a direct corollary of the following well-known result: for
any given probability measure P ∈∆(Ω) and δ > 0, any set A ∈ ℑ can be
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enlarged to an open set U ⊃ A such that P (U) < P (A) + δ [see Ulam’s
theorem, Theorem 7.1.4 in Dudley (1989)].
Proposition 1 shows that, given any test T1, there exists a rejection test
T2 that does not reject the data-generating process with probability almost
as high as T1, and the acceptance sets of T2 are contained in those of T1.
Thus, T2 is more capable than T1 to reject theories. For example, if T1 has
nonempty (or topologically large) revelation sets, then T2 is a rejection test
with nonempty (or topologically large) revelation sets. We refer to T2 as the
rejection test associated with the test T1.
Given ε > 0, let Tˆ ε be a rejection test (that does not reject the data-
generating process with probability 1− ε) associated with a global category
test TˆS . Corollary 1 follows immediately from Proposition 1 and Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. The rejection test Tˆ ε does not reject the data-generating
process with probability 1− ε, and it cannot be manipulated. The revelation
sets of Tˆ ε contain the revelation sets of the global category test, and, hence,
their complements are first-category sets.
For any given theory P , the test Tˆ ε delivers the rejection set of the the-
ory P that consists of finite histories of outcomes that must be regarded as
sufficiently inconsistent with the theory P to justify its rejection. This test
does not reject the actual data-generating process and, in contrast with ma-
nipulable tests, maintains the possibility of theory rejection (in finite time)
even if an uninformed individual randomizes with the intent of manipulating
the test. In addition, it follows directly from our proof that each revelation
set of Tˆ ε contains an open and dense set. Hence, the revelation sets of Tˆ ε
contain finite-histories.
4.1. A nonmanipulable likelihood test. In this section, we modify a global
category test so that, in this modified form, it belongs to the familiar class
of likelihood tests (and remains nonmanipulable).
Let an atom of a theory P be a path that P assigns strictly positive
measure. Let A⊆∆(Ω) be the set of all theories that attach probability one
to a set comprising finitely many atoms.
Let TˆS be a global category test. Given any natural number m ≥ 1, let
Tˆm be a rejection test that is harder than TˆS and does not reject the data-
generating process with probability 1
2(m+1)3
. Given a theory P, let RˆmP be
the rejection set of P (for test Tˆm). So, by definition,
P (RˆmP )≤
1
2(m+ 1)3
.
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Given any theory P ∈ (A)c, let CmP be a cylinder with finite base such
that
0< P (CmP )<
1
2(m+1)3
.(4.1)
The existence of a cylinder that satisfies (4.1) is shown in Remark A.1
in the Appendix. Let RmP := Rˆ
m
P ∪C
m
P , and let Q
m
P be the theory P ∈ (A)
c
conditional of RmP ; that is, for every A ∈ℑ,
QmP (A) =
P (A∩RmP )
P (RmP )
.(4.2)
Let pi(m) = 1(m+1)m . Let QP be the theory defined by
QP =
∞∑
m=1
pi(m)QmP .
Given a theory P ∈ (A)c, QP is well defined because
∞∑
m=1
pi(m) = 1.
The function Q :∆(Ω) −→ ∆(Ω), such that Q(P ) = QP if P ∈ (A)
c and
Q(P ) = P if P ∈A, defines the likelihood test T¯ .
Proposition 2. The likelihood test T¯ is harder than the global category
test TˆS.
The likelihood test T¯ , like any other likelihood test, does not reject the
data-generating process with probability 1. It follows from Proposition 2
that the revelation sets of the likelihood test T¯ contain those of the global
category test TˆS . Hence, the likelihood test T¯ is nonmanipulable.
4.2. The prequential principle. Prequential tests are manipulable, but
some nonprequential tests (e.g., the global category tests) are nonmanipu-
lable. These results pose a difficulty for the prequential principle, because
they indicate that the prequential principle must be discarded to produce a
nonmanipulable test. We examine in closer detail the relationship between
manipulability and the prequential principle. We now consider random tests.
That is, we allow Alice to randomize among prequential tests that do not
reject the data-generating process.
Let (Θ,B, v˜) be a probability space where Θ is a parameter space, B is
a σ-algebra and v˜ is a probability measure on (Θ,B). A random test is
probability space (Θ,B, v˜) and a function T˜ :Θ × Ω × ∆(Ω)→ {0,1}. So,
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for every parameter θ ∈ Θ, T˜θ :Ω ×∆(Ω)→ {0,1}, T˜θ(s,P ) = T˜ (θ, s,P ) is
a test. We also define T˜s(θ,P ) = T˜ (θ, s,P ) and T˜P (θ, s) = T˜ (θ, s,P ). We
assume that T˜ is measurable, jointly, with respect to θ, s and P (and we
refer to this assumption as the joint measurability condition).
A random test is prequential if, for every θ ∈Θ, T˜θ is a prequential test.
A random test does not reject the data-generating process with probability
one if, for every P ∈∆(Ω),
(v˜×P )({(θ, s) ∈Θ×Ω: T˜P (θ, s) = 1}) = 1.
We now construct a prequential random test T˜ that does not reject the
data-generating process with probability one. Given a countable dense set
S = {s1, s2, . . .}, let QS ∈∆(Ω) be a probability distribution defined by
QS(si) =
1
i(i+ 1)
for i = 1,2, . . . and QS(Ω − S) = 0. That is, QS assigns full measure to S.
Since
∞∑
i=1
1
i(i+1)
= 1,
QS is well defined.
Let TLRS be the likelihood test such that, for every theory P , the alterna-
tive theory is QS . This test is prequential because the alternative theory is
fixed independently of the theory announced by Bob. By general properties
of likelihood ratio tests, TLRS does not reject the data-generating process
with probability 1 [see Dawid (1982)].
Let Θ = Ω = {0,1}∞ be the parameter space. Given a path θ ∈ Θ, let
Sθ ⊂Ω be the set of all paths that coincide with θ in all but a finite number
of periods. That is,
Sθ = {s ∈Ω: |{t : It(s) 6= It(θ)}|<∞}
=
∞⋃
t=1
{0,1}t−1 ×{It(θ)} × {It+1(θ)} × · · · ;
of course the set Sθ is countable and dense in Ω. We define the randomized
likelihood test T˜LR as follows. First, let ∆˙(Ω)⊆∆(Ω) be the set of all theories
that assigns zero measure to any single path. Alice draws randomly a path
θ ∈Ω according to a probability measure v˜ ∈ ∆˙(Ω) and then tests Bob with
the likelihood test TLRSθ . So, T˜
LR(θ, s,P ) = TLRSθ (s,P ).
To make this definition precise, we must say how we represent the set Sθ
as a sequence s1θ, s
2
θ, . . . , because the probability distribution Q
Sθ depends
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on the order of the paths in Sθ. In addition, if we took an arbitrary rep-
resentation, the test T˜LR could potentially violate our joint measurability
condition.
One possible way to represent the set Sθ as a sequence of paths s
1
θ, s
2
θ, . . . is
such that for every t= 1,2, . . . the paths from {0,1}t×{It(θ)}×{It+1(θ)}×
· · · precede the paths from {0,1}t ×{It+1(θ)}×{It+2(θ)}× · · · − {0,1}
t−1 ×
{It(θ)} × {It+1(θ)} × · · ·, and paths from {0,1}
t × {It+1(θ)} × {It+2(θ)} ×
· · · − {0,1}t−1 × {It(θ)} × {It+1(θ)} × · · · are ordered lexicographically. As
shown in the Appendix (Lemma A.2), the joint measurability condition is
satisfied with the sets Sθ ordered in this way.
Bob knows that he is tested according to this protocol, but he does not
know the test selected by Alice. Given any random generator of theories
ζ ∈∆∆(Ω), let R0ζ(θ) be the revelation set of the test T
LR
Sθ
.
Proposition 3. Consider a randomized likelihood test T˜LR, (Ω,ℑ, v˜),
v˜ ∈ ∆˙(Ω). For every random generator of theories ζ ∈ ∆∆(Ω), v˜-almost
surely, R0ζ(θ) is the complement of a first-category set of paths.
Assume that Alice tests Bob with a randomized likelihood test and that
Bob uses an arbitrary random generator of theories ζ . Proposition 3 shows
that, with v˜-probability one, Alice selects a prequential test TLRSθ for which
there exist a topologically large set of paths that, if realized, ζ-almost surely,
reject Bob’s theory.
We now provide a general result showing that random prequential tests,
including the randomized likelihood test, are manipulable as far as a natural
generalization (to random tests) of definition 3 of manipulability goes.
Proposition 4. Fix any δ > 0. Let (Θ,B, v˜) and T˜ be a prequential
random test (satisfying the joint measurability condition) that does not reject
the data-generating process with probability 1. Then, there exists a random
generator of theories ζ˜ such that, on any path s ∈Ω,
ζ˜({P ∈∆(Ω) : v˜-almost surely T˜ (θ, s,P ) = 1})≥ 1− δ.
The random generator of theories ζ˜ may depend upon δ, (Θ,B, v˜) and T˜ ,
but it does not require (for its construction) any distributional assumptions
over the future realizations of the paths. Proposition 4 shows that Bob can
produce theories according to a random device ζ˜ such that, no matter which
path s is realized, it is unlikely (odds given by v˜ and ζ˜) that Alice selects a
test that rejects Bob’s theory.
To reconcile Propositions 3 and 4, consider the randomized likelihood
test (Ω,ℑ, v˜), T˜LR. This test satisfies the joint measurability conditions,
and so, the conclusions of Propositions 3 and 4 hold for this test. Let Ev˜
and Eζ be the expectation operators associated with v˜ and ζ, respectively.
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By Proposition 3, for every ζ ∈∆∆(Ω),
Ev˜
{
inf
s∈Ω
Eζ{T˜LRs }
}
= 0.(4.3)
By Proposition 4, for every δ > 0 there exists ζ˜ ∈∆∆(Ω) such that
inf
s∈Ω
E ζ˜Ev˜{T˜LRs } ≥ 1− δ.(4.4)
From (4.3), Bob knows that Alice (almost surely) selects a test for which
there are paths that, if realized, will (almost surely) reject Bob’s randomly
selected theories. From (4.4), Bob knows that if he selects a theory with
carefully designed odds (by ζ˜), then (no matter how the data evolves in the
future) it is unlikely that the selected theory will be rejected by Alice’s test.
Consider the question of whether a strategic, but uninformed, expert can
pass a random prequential test (which does not reject the data-generating
process). Proposition 3 seems to answers this question in the negative while
Proposition 4 seems to answer this question in the positive. Hence, results
(4.3) and (4.4) leave room for different interpretations. In our viewpoint,
Proposition 4 is a natural generalization (to random tests) of existing re-
sults showing that prequential tests are manipulable. Our preference (for
result 4 over 3) can be understood in the context of decision-making under
uncertainty as described in Section 3.1.
Assume that Alice offers a contract to Bob. If Bob accepts the contract,
he delivers a theory to Alice and receives positive payment. However, if
Bob’s theory is rejected by the test selected by the randomized likelihood
test, then Bob is penalized. Now, assume that Bob knows nothing about
the data-generating process. Then, Bob faces uncertainty about the proba-
bilities of the future realizations of the data. By definition, Bob knows the
odds that Alice uses to select her test, and he also knows the odds that
he uses to select his theory. Hence, with regards to theory selection and
to test selection, Bob faces common risk. The most pessimistic behavioral
rule of decision under uncertainty, among those axiomatized by Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989), determines Bob’s prospects by his expected utility com-
puted in the worse-case scenario [as in (4.4)]. By this rule of decision under
uncertainty, Bob accepts Alice’s contract. Hence, prequential random tests
do not screen informed and uniformed experts.
The results showing that prequential tests (and even randomizations over
prequential tests, Proposition 3 withstanding) are manipulable, combined
with the fact that some nonprequential tests are nonmanipulable, poses a
difficulty for the prequential principle (as far as testing potentially strate-
gic experts goes). However, this difficulty may not persist under conditions
that are beyond the scope of this paper. Fortnow and Vohra (2007) show a
prequential test that is computationally demanding to manipulate. In addi-
tion, Olszewski and Sandroni (2008) show a prequential test that cannot be
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manipulated when the domain of permissible theories (i.e., the theories the
expert is allowed to announce) is restricted. It is not known whether the re-
sults in this paper extend to the case of multiple experts [see Al-Najjar and
Weinstein (2007) and Feinberg and Stewart (2007) for some results on test-
ing several experts simultaneously]. Finally, while any given prequential test
(which does not reject the data-generating process) can be manipulated, it is
not possible to manipulate all prequential tests (that do not reject the data-
generating process) simultaneously [see Olszewski and Sandroni (2008)].
4.3. Nonprequential manipulable tests. As mentioned in the Introduction,
prequential tests are manipulable. So, prequentiality is a sufficient condition
for manipulability, but it is not a necessary condition. We now show several
tests, many of them nonprequential, that can be manipulated.
Definition 7. Acceptance tests have the property that, for any theory
P ∈∆(Ω), the acceptance set AP is a union of cylinders.
In an acceptance test, the acceptance sets are open. In a rejection test,
the rejection sets are open.
Proposition 5. Fix any ε ∈ [0,1] and δ ∈ (0,1− ε]. Let T be an accep-
tance test that does not reject the data-generating process with probability
1− ε. Then, the test T can be manipulated with probability 1− ε− δ.
A formal proof of Proposition 5 is presented in the Appendix. An intuition
is as follows: let V :∆(Ω)×∆∆(Ω)→ [0,1] be a function defined by V (P, ζ) =
EPEζT ; that is, V (P, ζ) is the probability of the verdict 1 if P is the data-
generating process and ζ is the random generator of theories used by Bob. By
assumption, for every P ∈∆(Ω), there exists ζP ∈ ∆∆(Ω) (a deterministic
generator of theories that assigns probability one to P ) such that V (P, ζP ) =
1− ε. Thus, if the conditions of Fan’s minmax theorem are satisfied, then
there also exists ζT ∈ ∆∆(Ω) such that V (P, ζT )≥ 1− ε− δ for every P ∈
∆(Ω). This yields the result, since V (P, ζT ) = ζT ({Q ∈∆(Ω) | T (s,Q) = 1})
if P is the degenerated measure that assigns probability one to s.
As is well known, ∆(Ω) is compact in the weak*-topology and V is a
bilinear function. Hence, the conditions of Fan’s minmax theorem (see the
Appendix for this result) are satisfied if V is lower semi-continuous with re-
spect to P . We show that this lower semi-continuity follows from the open-
ness of acceptance sets. It is here that the assumption that T is open turns
out to be essential. In the case of a rejection test, V is upper semi-continuous
with respect to P , but not necessarily lower semi-continuous.
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APPENDIX: PROOFS
Proof of Theorem 1. Define Aik(P ) := Ω− C(s
i
t(i,k,P )) as the com-
plement of C(sit(i,k,P )). Let
Ak(P ) :=
∞⋂
i=1
Aik(P ) and AˆP :=
∞⋃
k=1
Ak(P )∪
∞⋃
i=1
{si}.
Each set Ak(P ) is an intersection of closed sets and is therefore closed
itself. By construction, each set Ak(P ) has an empty interior; indeed, the
complement of Ak(P ); that is, the set
Ω−Ak(P ) =
∞⋃
i=1
C(sit(i,k,P ))
is open and dense. Hence, AˆP is a first-category set. Notice that AˆP is the
acceptance set of P ∈∆(Ω).
Since
Ω− AˆP ⊂Ω−
(
Ak(P ) ∪
∞⋃
i=1
{si}
)
⊂
∞⋃
i=1
[C(sit(i,k,P ))−{s
i}]
for all k ∈N ,
P (Ω− AˆP )≤
∞∑
i=1
P (C(sit(i,k,P ))−{s
i})≤
∞∑
i=1
1
2k+i
=
1
2k
,
also for all k ∈N , which yields that P (AˆP ) = 1. Thus, the global category
test does not reject the data-generating process with probability one. It
remains to show that the test cannot be manipulated. Suppose we are given
a ζ ∈∆∆(Ω). We first show that there exists a subset Aˆ of Ω, which is a
countable union of closed sets with empty interior, and a Borel set B ⊂∆(Ω)
such that
ζ(B) = 1(A.1)
and
∀P∈B AˆP ⊂ Aˆ.(A.2)
We show later (in Corollary A.1, which follows this proof) that for every
s the set {P ∈∆(Ω) : s ∈ AˆP } is Borel. Since
B ⊂ {P ∈∆(Ω) : s /∈ AˆP }
for every s ∈Ω− Aˆ, we obtain that
∀
s∈Ω−Aˆ ζ({P ∈∆(Ω) : s ∈ AˆP }) = 0.
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This means that Ω− Aˆ⊂R0ζ , and so the complement of R
0
ζ is a first category
set.
We will now construct sets Aˆ and B with properties (A.1)–(A.2). Consider
the sets
Bik(m) := {P ∈∆(Ω) : t(i, k,P )>m};
Lemma A.1, which follows this proof, shows that the sets Bik(m) are open
and so Borel. Since this sequence of sets is descending (with respect to m,
for any given k and i) and its intersection is empty, for every l = 1,2, . . .
there exists an m such that
ζ(Bik(m))≤
1
2k+i+l
;
denote by mik(l) any such m.
Let now
Aik(l) := Ω−C(s
i
m) for m=m
i
k(l),
Ak(l) :=
∞⋂
i=1
Aik(l)
and
Aˆ(l) :=
∞⋃
k=1
Ak(l) ∪
∞⋃
i=1
{si}.
The set A(l) is a countable union of closed sets with empty interior by an
argument analogous to that used, in the main body of the paper, for the
case of the sets AˆP , and so is
Aˆ :=
∞⋃
l=1
Aˆ(l).
To show that (A.1) and (A.2) are satisfied, notice that, by the definition of
Bik(m) for m=m
i
k(l), if P /∈B
i
k(m), then C(s
i
m)⊂C(s
i
t(i,k,P )); therefore,
if P ∈∆(Ω)−
∞⋃
i=1
Bik(m
i
k(l)) then Ak(P )⊂Ak(l),
which in turn yields that
if P ∈∆(Ω)−
∞⋃
k=1
∞⋃
i=1
Bik(m
i
k(l)) then AˆP ⊂ Aˆ(l).
Thus,
B :=
∞⋃
l=1
[
∆(Ω)−
∞⋃
k=1
∞⋃
i=1
Bik(m
i
k(l))
]
⊂ {P ∈∆(Ω) : AˆP ⊂ Aˆ}.
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It remains to show that ζ(B) = 1; however,
ζ(B)≥ ζ
(
∆(Ω)−
∞⋃
k=1
∞⋃
i=1
Bik(m
i
k(l))
)
≥ 1−
∞∑
k=1
∞∑
i=1
ζ(Bik(m
i
k(l)))
≥ 1−
∞∑
k=1
∞∑
i=1
1
2k+i+l
= 1−
1
2l
for every l ∈N . 
Lemma A.1. For every t ∈N , the set
Bik(t) := {P ∈∆(Ω) : t(i, k,P )> t}
is open.
Proof. Let P ∈Bik(t). By definition, t(i, k,P )> t, which means that
P (C(sit)−{s
i})>
1
2k+i
.
Further, there exists an m> t such that
P (C(sit)−C(s
i
m))>
1
2k+i
;(A.3)
indeed, the sequence of sets C(sit)−C(s
i
m) is ascending (as m goes to infin-
ity), and its union is equal to C(sit)−{s
i}.
Note that each cylinder is an open and closed subset of Ω, and so is
C(sit)−C(s
i
m). Thus, the function f :Ω→R given by
f(s) =
{
1, for every s ∈C(sit)−C(s
i
m),
0, for every s /∈C(sit)−C(s
i
m),
is continuous.
Let
δ := P (C(sit)−C(s
i
m))−
1
2k+i
,(A.4)
and let N(P ) stand for the set all measures Q ∈ ∆(Ω) such that∣∣∣∣ ∫ f dQ− ∫ f dP ∣∣∣∣< δ.
This last inequality means that
|Q(C(sit)−C(s
i
m))−P (C(s
i
t)−C(s
i
m))|< δ;
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by (A.3) and (A.4),
Q(C(sit)− {s
i})≥Q(C(sit)−C(s
i
m))> 1/2
k+i,
which implies that Q ∈Bki (t).
That is, the set N(P ), which is an open neighborhood of P in weak∗-
topology, is contained in Bik(t). 
Corollary A.1. For every s ∈Ω, the set {P ∈∆(Ω) : s ∈ AˆP } is Borel.
Proof. If s = si for some i ∈N , then {P ∈∆(Ω) : s ∈ AˆP} =∆(Ω) by
definition. Suppose, therefore, that s 6= si for any i ∈N . It suffices to show
that the sets {P ∈∆(Ω) : s ∈C(sit(i,k,P ))} are Borel, as
{P ∈∆(Ω) : s ∈ AˆP }=∆(Ω)−
[
∞⋂
k=1
(
∞⋃
i=1
{P ∈∆(Ω) : s ∈C(sit(i,k,P ))}
)]
.
Since s 6= si and CkP (s
i
0) = ∆(Ω), there is a unique m = 0,1, . . . such that
s ∈CkP (s
i
m)−C
k
P (s
i
m+1). For thism, we have that {P ∈∆(Ω) : s ∈C(s
i
t(i,k,P ))}=
∆(Ω)−{P ∈∆(Ω) : t(i, k,P )>m}, and so the set {P ∈∆(Ω) : s ∈C(si
t(i,k,P ))}
is closed by Lemma A.1. 
Proof of Proposition 2. First, consider P ∈ (A)c. It follows from
(4.2) and from P (RmP )≤
1
(m+1)3
that, for any cylinder C ⊆RmP ,
QmP (C)≥
P (C)
P (RmP )
≥ (m+ 1)3P (C).
By definition, QP (A)≥ pi(m)Q
m
P (A) =
1
(m+1)mQ
m
P (A) for any m≥ 1 and
set A ∈ ℑ. Hence, for any cylinder C ⊆RmP ,
QP (C)≥
(m+ 1)3
(m+ 1)m
P (C)≥mP (C).(A.5)
Given a theory P ∈ (A)c, let RˆP and R¯P be the rejection sets of P for the
tests TˆS and T¯ , respectively. Consider a path s ∈ RˆP . Then, s ∈ Rˆ
m
P for every
m≥ 1, because Tˆm is harder than TˆS . Since Rˆ
m
P comprises cylinders, there
is a cylinder C(sn(m)) with base on sn(m) = s | n(m) such that C(sn(m))⊆
RˆmP ⊆R
m
P . By (A.5),
QP (C(sn(m)))
P (C(sn(m)))
≥m =⇒ lim
m→∞
QP (C(sn(m)))
P (C(sn(m)))
=∞.
Thus, s ∈ R¯P . So, if P ∈ (A)
c, then RˆP ⊆ R¯P .
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Now, consider a theory P ∈ A. Consider a path s ∈ RˆP . Given that P
assigns probability one to the union of all its atoms, it follows that s is
not an atom of P . So, P (C(st)), st = s | t, approaches zero as t goes to
infinity. Since P has finitely many atoms, there exists an η > 0 such that
the probability of each atom is smaller than η. Let t be large enough so that
P (C(st))< η. It follows that C(st) contains no atom. Hence, P (C(st)) = 0.
So, s ∈ R¯P . It follows that T¯ is harder than Tˆ . 
Remark A.1. The existence of a cylinder with finite base that satisfies
(4.1) can be shown as follows.
If P ∈ (A)c, then there are infinitely many atoms, or the set of all nonatoms
has positive measure. If there are infinitely many atoms, then one of them
(say s) has to have measure below 14(m+1)3 . It follows that the P (C(st)),
st = s | t, must be strictly positive and (for t large enough) smaller than
1
2(m+1)3 . Now, consider the case in which the set of all nonatoms of P has
positive measure. Assume that every nonatom s ∈Ω of P is contained in a
cylinder Cs (with finite base) such that P assigns zero probability to Cs. Let
C¯ be the union of all zero-probability cylinders. There are only countably
many cylinders with finite base. So, P (C¯) = 0. Given that C¯ contains all
nonatoms of P , it follows that the set of nonatoms has zero measure. This
is a contradiction. So, P has a nonatom s such that P (C(st)) 6= 0, st = s | t,
for all t ∈N. Since P (C(st)) approaches zero as t goes to infinity, P (C(st))
must (for t large enough) be smaller than 12(m+1)3 .
Lemma A.2. The test T˜LR satisfies the joint measurability condition.
Proof. We need show that the set
{(θ, s,P ) ∈Θ×Ω×∆(Ω) :TLRS (θ, s,P ) = 1}
is measurable. Notice that
{(θ, s,P ) ∈Θ×Ω×∆(Ω) :TLRS (θ, s,P ) = 1}
=
{
(θ, s,P )∈Θ×Ω×∆(Ω) :
∀n∈NP (C(sn)) 6= 0 and lim sup
n→∞
QSθ(C(sn))
P (C(sn))
<∞
}
=Θ×Ω×∆(Ω)
−
∞⋂
k=1
∞⋃
n=1
{(θ, s,P ) ∈Θ×Ω×∆(Ω) :QSθ(C(sn))> kP (C(sn))},
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where (as always) sn = s | n. To see the last equality, notice that QSθ(C(sn))>
0 for every cylinder C(sn), so if P (C(sn)) = 0, then the inequality QSθ(C(sn))>
kP (C(sn)) is satisfied. Therefore, it suffices to show that sets of the form
{(θ, s,P ) ∈Θ×Ω×∆(Ω) :QSθ(C(sn))> kP (C(sn))}
are measurable.
Further, the inequality that defines this last set depends only on sn, not
on the entire path s, so this set can be represented as a union of sets
{(θ,P ) ∈Θ×∆(Ω) :QSθ(C(sn))> kP (C(sn))} ×C(sn),
and so it suffices to show that sets of the form {(θ,P ) ∈Θ×∆(Ω) :QSθ(C)>
kP (C)}, where C is a given cylinder (with base on sn), are measurable. We
will show that every set of this form is open.
Indeed, a pair (θ,P ) belonging to this set means that∑
i:si
θ
∈C
1
i(i+ 1)
> kP (C);(A.6)
denote by η > 0 the difference between the two expressions. Take the set of
all paths θ such that ∑
i:si
θ
∈C
1
i(i+ 1)
>M := kP (C) +
η
2
,(A.7)
and the set of all probability distributions P such that
|P (C)−P (C)|<
η
2k
.
Obviously, the Cartesian product of the two sets contains the pair (θ,P ),
and any pair (θ,P ) that belongs to this Cartesian product satisfies condition
(A.6) (for P replaced with P and θ replaced with θ). So, it suffices to show
that the two sets are open. The fact that the latter set is open follows directly
from the definition of weak*-topology, as any cylinder C is a closed and open
subset of Ω.
We will now show that the former set is also open. If θ satisfies (A.7),
then ∑
i:si
θ
∈Ct(θ)
1
i(i+ 1)
>M,
for some t= 1,2, . . . , where
Ct(θ) :=C ∩ {0,1}t ×{It+1(θ)} × {It+2(θ)} × · · · .
This follows from the assumption that the paths from {0,1}t × {It(θ)} ×
{It+1(θ)}× · · · precede the paths from Sθ−{0,1}
t×{It+1(θ)}×{It+2(θ)}×
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· · · in the sequence s1θ, s
2
θ, . . . and the fact that, if an infinite sum exceeds
some number, then sufficiently large finite sums exceed that number as well.
With no loss of generality, one can assume that t≥ n; recall that n is the
length of the base of C. Then, for any θ
′
∈C(θt), the cylinder with base on
the first t outcomes of θ, we have∑
i:si
θ
′∈C
1
i(i+1)
>
∑
i:si
θ
′∈C
t(θ
′
)
1
i(i+1)
=
∑
i:si
θ
∈Ct(θ)
1
i(i+1)
>M ;
the middle equality follows from the fact that the first t outcomes of θ and
θ
′
coincide, and so si(θ) ∈Ct(θ) is equivalent to si(θ
′
) ∈Ct(θ
′
). 
Lemma A.3. Let S = {s1, s2, . . .} be a countable dense subset of Ω. Take
any P ∈∆(Ω) such that P (S) = 0. The set of paths on which TLRS rejects P
is a superset of the set of paths on which the global category test TˆS rejects
P .
Proof. Take any s ∈ Ω such that T̂S(s,P ) = 0 and k = 1,2, . . . . Then,
s ∈C(sit(i,k,P )) for some i = 1,2, . . . ; in other words, st(i,k,P ) = s
i
t(i,k,P ). On
one hand, as P (S) = 0,
P (C(sit(i,k,P ))) = P (C(s
i
t(i,k,P ))− {s
i})≤
1
2k+i
,
and, on the other,
QS(C(sit(i,k,P )))≥Q
S(si) =
1
i(i+ 1)
.
Thus,
QS(C(st(i,k,P )))
P (C(st(i,k,P )))
≥
2k+i
i(i+ 1)
≥ 2k−1
for every k = 1,2, . . . , which means that the sequence (Q
S(C(st))
P (C(st))
)∞t=1 is un-
bounded. 
Proof of Proposition 3. We show that, except countably many
paths θ, the set R0ζ(θ) is a superset of the revelation set R
0
ζ of the global
category test T̂S for S = Sθ. Suppose that R
0
ζ(θ) is not a superset of the
revelation set R0ζ of the global category test T̂S for S = Sθ. Then, by Lemma
A.3, it must be the case that
ζ({P ∈∆(Ω) :P (Sθ)> 0})> 0.
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If this is the case for an uncountable number of θ ∈ Θ, then there exist
m,n ∈N such that
ζ
({
P ∈∆(Ω) : P (Sθ)>
1
m
})
>
1
n
,
for an uncountable set Ξ⊂Θ.
Notice that the set Θ can be partitioned into countable subsets such that
θ1 and θ2 belong to the same subset if Sθ1 = Sθ2 ; that is, paths θ
1 and θ2
coincide on all but a finite number of outcomes. Notice further that, if θ1
and θ2 belong to the distinct subsets, then the sets Sθ1 and Sθ2 are disjoint.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that distinct paths from Ξ belong
to distinct subsets; that is, they differ on an infinite number of outcomes.
Therefore, for any P ∈∆(Ω), P (Sθ)> 1/m for at most m− 1 paths θ ∈ Ξ.
Further, we can restrict attention to an infinite but countable subset of Ξ;
from now on, we will denote this subset by Ξ.
Consider any linear ordering - of the set Ξ, and define sets
Dkθ :=
{
P ∈∆(Ω) : θ is kth path from Ξ such that P (Sθ)>
1
m
}
for k = 1, . . . ,m− 1 and θ ∈ Ξ.
For a given k = 1, . . . ,m− 1, the sets Dkθ are pairwise disjoint, and, for
a given θ ∈ Ξ, the sets Dkθ are pairwise disjoint. The measurability of the
sets Dkθ follows from the measurability of the set of all measures P that at a
given path s have an atom of measure larger than a given number. Finally,{
P ∈∆(Ω) :P (Sθ)>
1
m
}
=D1θ ∪ · · · ∪D
m−1
θ
for every θ ∈ Ξ.
Thus,
m− 1 = (m− 1) · ζ(∆(Ω))
≥
m−1∑
k=1
ζ
(⋃
θ∈Ξ
Dkθ
)
=
m−1∑
k=1
(∑
θ∈Ξ
ζ(Dkθ )
)
=
∑
θ∈Ξ
(
m−1∑
k=1
ζ(Dkθ )
)
=
∑
θ∈Ξ
ζ
({
P ∈∆(Ω) :P (Sθ)>
1
m
})
>
∑
θ∈Ξ
1
n
=∞,
a contradiction. 
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Proof of Proposition 4. Let T˜ ′ :Ω×∆(Ω)→{0,1} be a test defined
by T˜ ′(s,P ) = 1 if and only if T˜ (θ, s,P ) = 1 v˜-almost surely. The test T˜ ′ is a
prequential test because, given two theories P and P ′ equivalent along s, for
every θ ∈Θ, T˜ (θ, s,P ) = 1 if and only if T˜ (θ, s,P ′) = 1. Hence, T˜ (θ, s,P ) = 1,
v˜-almost surely, if and only if T˜ (θ, s,P ′) = 1, v˜-almost surely. Since, for every
θ ∈Θ,
P ({s ∈Ω | T˜ (θ, s,P ) = 1}) = 1,
by Fubini’s theorem
P ({s ∈Ω | T˜ (θ, s,P ) = 1 v˜-almost surely}) = 1.
So, T˜ ′ does not reject the data-generating process with probability one.
By Shmaya’s (2008) result [which relies on Martin’s (1998) theorem], there
exists ζ˜ such that for all s ∈Ω
ζ˜({P ∈∆(Ω) | T˜ ′(s,P ) = 1})≥ 1− δ. 
Let X be a metric space. Recall that a function f :X→R is lower semi-
continuous at an x ∈X if, for every sequence (xn)
∞
n=1 converging to x,
∀ε>0 ∃N ∀n≥N f(xn)> f(x)− ε.
The function f is lower semi-continuous if it is lower semi-continuous at
every x ∈X . We refer the reader to Engelking [(1989), Problem 1.7.14] for
these definitions and some basic results regarding lower semi-continuous
functions.
Lemma A.4. Let U ⊂X be an open set where X is a compact metric
space. Equip X with the σ-algebra of Borel subsets. Let ∆(X) be the set of
all probability measures on X. Equip ∆(X) with the weak*-topology. The
function F :∆(X)→ [0,1] defined by
F (P ) = P (U)
is lower semi-continuous.
Proof. See Dudley (1989), Theorem 11.1.1(b). 
Theorem [Fan (1953)]. Let X be a compact Hausdorff space, which is
a convex subset of a linear space, and let Y be a convex subset of linear space
(not necessarily topologized). Let f be a real-valued function on X ×Y such
that for every y ∈ Y , f(x, y) is lower semi-continuous, with respect to x. If
f is also convex, with respect to x, and concave, with respect to y, then
min
x∈X
sup
y∈Y
f(x, y) = sup
y∈Y
min
x∈X
f(x, y).
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We note that Fan’s (1953) theorem allows for X and Y that may not be
subsets of linear spaces. We, however, apply his result only to subsets of
linear spaces.
Proof of Proposition 5. Let X = ∆(Ω), let Y be the subset of
∆(∆(Ω)) that consists of all random generators of theories with finite sup-
port. So, an element ζ of Y can be described by a finite sequence of proba-
bility measures {P1, . . . , Pn} and positive weights {pi1, . . . , pin} that add up
to one, where ζ selects Pi with probability pii, i= 1, . . . , n. Let the function
f :X × Y →R be defined by
f(P, ζ) :=EPEζT =
n∑
i=1
pii
∫
T (s,Pi)dP (s).(A.8)
We now check that the assumptions of Fan’s theorem are satisfied. Since
T is an open test, the set
UQ = {s ∈Ω:T (s,Q) = 1}
is open for every Q ∈∆(Ω). Therefore, by Lemma A.4,
P (UQ) =
∫
T (s,Q)dP (s)
is a lower semi-continuous function of P . Thus, for every ζ ∈ Y , the function
f(P, ζ) is lower semi-continuous on X as a weighted average of lower semi-
continuous functions.
By definition, f is linear with respect to both x and y, and so it is convex
with respect to x and concave with respect to y. By the Riesz and Banach–
Alaoglu theorems, X is a compact space in weak∗-topology; it is a metric
space, and so Hausdorff [see, e.g., Rudin (1973), Theorem 3.17].
Thus, by Theorem 1,
min
P∈X
sup
ζ∈Y
EPEζT = sup
ζ∈Y
min
P∈X
EPEζT.
Notice that the left-hand side of this equality exceeds 1− ε, as the test T
is assumed not to reject the data-generating process with probability 1− ε;
indeed, for a given P ∈X , take ζ such that ζ({P}) = 1. Therefore, the right-
hand side exceeds 1− ε, which yields the existence of a random generator
of theories ζ ∈ Y such that
EPEζT > 1− ε− δ
for every P ∈∆(Ω). Taking, for any given s ∈Ω, the probability measure P
such that P ({s}) = 1, we obtain
ζ({Q ∈∆(Ω) :T (s,Q) = 1})> 1− ε− δ. 
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